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Abstract: This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance (CR) game to study how 
different forms of repeated interactions, with and without communication, can help coordinate 
subordinates’ collective resistance to a “divide-and-conquer” transgression against their personal 
interests. In the one-shot CR game, a first–mover (the “leader”) decides whether to transgress 
against two responders. Successful transgression increases the payoff of the leader at the expense 
of the victim(s) of transgression. The two responders then simultaneously decide whether to 
challenge the leader. The subordinates face a coordination problem in that their challenge against 
the leader’s transgression will only succeed if both of them incur the cost to do so. The outcome 
without transgression can occur in equilibrium with standard money-maximizing preferences 
with repeated interactions, but this outcome is not an equilibrium with standard preferences when 
adding non-binding subordinate “cheap talk” communication in the one-shot game. Nevertheless, 
we find that communication (in the one-shot game) is at least as effective as repetition (with no 
communication) in reducing the transgression rate. Moreover, communication is better than 
repetition in coordinating resistance, because it makes it easier for subordinates to identify others 
who have social preferences and are willing to incur the cost to punish a violation of social 
norms. 
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Organizational and political leaders often engage in strategic behavior to extract surplus 
from their subordinates, and such behavior can have significant welfare impacts on organizations 
(Miller, 1992; Gibbons, 2001) and societies (North and Weingast, 1989; Weingast, 1995, 1997).  
A strategy widely used by leaders is called “divide-and-conquer,” in which a leader extracts 
surplus from a victim and shares it with a beneficiary to gain the latter’s support. This paper 
introduces the laboratory repeated collective resistance (hereafter CR) game to investigate how 
repeated interactions and communication between “responders” can coordinate their resistance 
towards divide-and-conquer transgression that attacks their personal interests. In the one-shot 
laboratory CR game, a first–mover (the “leader”) decides whether to transgress against two 
responders. Successful transgression increases the payoff of the leader at the expense of the 
victim(s) of transgression. The two responders then simultaneously decide whether to incur the 
costs to challenge the leader. In making this decision, the two responders face a coordination 
problem in that their challenge against the transgression will only succeed if both of them resist.  
In this game, the leader can either transgress against both responders, or can practice 
divide-and-conquer transgression targeted at only one responder and share part of the surplus 
expropriated from the victim with the other responder. The use of divide-and-conquer strategy to 
ensure that the beneficiary of a transgression will not join forces with the victim to challenge the 
transgression is widely observed in many settings. For example, a political leader may 
expropriate wealth from one group of citizens, and share some of this expropriated wealth with 
another group of citizens to obtain their support (Weingast, 1995, 1997; Acemoglu et al., 2004). 
The management of a university may unilaterally alter fiscal arrangements between the central   3
administration and various schools to confiscate surplus from these schools, and share some of 
the confiscated surplus with other schools to gain their support. A firm that is negotiating 
contracts with several unions may offer stringent terms to some unions and more favorable terms 
to others to create significant divergent interests among the unions.
3  
The importance of divide-and-conquer strategies has long been recognized. In chapter 
one of The Art of War, Sun Tze (476--221BC) observed that “(w)ar is primarily a game of 
deception … When the enemy are united, one should try to cause internal dissension.” In chapter 
3 of The Prince, Machiavelli (1513), when giving advice regarding how to rule a colony, advises 
that “(a)nyone who rules a foreign country should take the initiative in becoming a proctor of the 
neighboring minor powers and contrive to weaken those who are powerful within the country 
itself.” Despite the widely recognized importance of divide-and conquer strategies, only recently 
has a small literature emerged that systematically studies their importance. Several recent 
contributions explicitly emphasize that the extent to which the responders can solve the 
coordination problem they face when attempting to organize collective resistance is crucial in 
determining whether divide-and-conquer transgression will occur in the first place (Weingast, 
1995, 1997, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2004).  
In his pioneering work in this area, Weingast (1995, 1997) presents a game-theoretic 
model to demonstrate how a leader can use the divide-and-conquer (hereafter DAC) strategy to 
prevent coordinated resistance, by sharing some of the confiscated surplus with a subset of 
subordinates. Our laboratory CR game is based on this model of DAC transgression (which 
                                                 
3 Kutalik and Biddle (2006) discuss how concessions imposed through bankruptcy court in recent disputes between 
managements and unions of several airlines have targeted specific unions. Some unions have joined forces to form 
the Airline Workers United—an across occupations and airlines organization—to counter this divide-and-conquer 
strategy. Richard Turk, Communication Officer for Airline Mechanics Fraternal Association (AMFA), argues that 
“(P)art of the reason for the effectiveness of the airlines' divide-and-conquer strategy is the serious lack of 
communication and planned strategies amongst many unions--even at the same company …The coming together of 
activists from throughout the industry can be a large step in the right direction.” 
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Weingast refers to as the Sovereign-Constituency Transgression game). As we shall explain in 
detail later, in the one-shot version of the CR game, the beneficiary of a DAC transgression has 
no financial incentive to challenge as successful transgression increases her payoff. Since the 
transgression will only be thwarted if both the victim and the beneficiary challenge, the victim of 
a DAC transgression will also not challenge as she expects that the beneficiary will not do so. 
This implies that transgression by the leader will always take place in the one-shot CR game.  
Weingast (1995, 1997) further points out that the folk theorem of repeated games 
(Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; also see Abreu, 1988, and Wen, 2002) implies that if the CR 
game is repeated indefinitely, then by adopting trigger strategies the subordinates can support 
their preferred outcome of no transgression. The leader is deterred from practicing transgression 
by the threat of collective resistance. Of course, because there are multiple equilibria in the 
indefinitely repeated CR game, whether or not repetition will in fact reduce transgression is an 
empirical question. Furthermore, because the one-shot CR game has multiple equilibria the 
analysis by Benoit and Krishna (1987) suggests that even with finite repetition, the outcome 
without transgression can be supported as an equilibrium in the (early periods) of the finitely 
repeated CR game. This paper reports a laboratory test of whether indefinite and finite repetition 
in fact reduces DAC transgression.  
Besides investigating whether repetition reduces transgression, we also study whether 
communication reduces transgression and compare its effect to that of repeated interactions. An 
implicit assumption in Weingast (1995, 1997, 2005) is that both the leaders and the responders 
are only concerned with their own material interests. This assumption ensures that the 
beneficiary of a DAC transgression never challenges in the one-shot CR game, which drives the 
result that all equilibria involve some type of transgression in the one-shot CR game. 
Furthermore, if all the players in the CR game are only concerned about their own material 
interests, then allowing for non-binding communication (“cheap talk”) (Crawford and Sobel,   5
1982) between the beneficiary and the victim will not change the prediction that transgression 
occurs in all one-shot CR games if the divide-and-conquer strategy is available.  
Recent contributions on social preferences, however, suggest that while many individuals 
have standard self-regarding preferences, some individuals may be altruistic punishers or have 
other types of social preferences (see, for example, Camerer, 2003, Gintis et al., 2005; and the 
references cited there). Those individuals may be willing to incur the cost to punish a violation of 
social norms, even when they are not directly hurt by such violations, and even when there is no 
significant scope for repeated interactions. In the CR game, suppose the beneficiary of a DAC 
transgression regards transgression by the leader as socially unacceptable, and therefore is 
willing to incur personal costs to engage in altruistic punishment against the leader. If the victim 
knows this, then the victim will also incur the cost to resist transgression. These observations 
suggest that some successful collective resistance against DAC transgression can occur in 
equilibrium in the one-shot CR game when social preferences are present. Furthermore, with 
heterogeneous preferences, non-binding communication, by providing the opportunity for the 
responders to signal their “types” to others, can alter behavior and deter transgression.  
This experiment employs a complete factorial design to investigate how communication 
and repeated interactions may affect DAC transgression. The two treatment variables are the 
matching protocol and the communication protocol. The matching protocol varies from random 
matching to various forms of repeated interactions, while the communication protocol allows for 
both the presence and the absence of communication—a simple binary, nonbinding message 
regarding “intended” resistance to a transgression. This design allows us to investigate how 
adding communication affects transgression when the matching protocol is held constant at the 
Random Matching treatment to control for repeated game effects. It also allows us to investigate 
how embedding communication in each form of repeated interactions affects behavior.  
We find that both indefinite and finite repetition (without communication) reduce   6
transgression. Contrary to a model based on standard preferences, we find that communication 
reduces transgression even with random matching; in fact, communication alone is at least as 
effective as repetition in reducing transgression. Consistent with the hypothesis that 
communication facilitates type identification in the presence of heterogeneous preferences, the 
“intended choice” communicated by the beneficiary is critical for increasing resistance to DAC 
transgression. We also identify an interesting mechanism that limits the effectiveness of repeated 
interactions in facilitating cooperation in this game. In particular, even if a beneficiary has social 
preferences and would like to punish a transgressing leader, she may not challenge the leader in 
the repeated game because she risks revealing her social preference type to the leader. This can 
be particularly costly to her if the other responder has standard preferences and will not 
challenge DAC transgression as a beneficiary, as the leader may then target his future 
transgressions against this responder who has social preferences. This problem does not arise 
when responders can communicate intentions privately, which may be one reason why even such 
nonbinding communications more effectively deter transgression. 
 
2. Communication, Repeated Interaction, and the Laboratory Collective Resistance Game 
Figure 1 illustrates the laboratory CR game implemented in this study, which is based on 
Weingast (1995, 1997) and captures the following ideas. First, successful transgression allows 
the leader to extract surplus from the responders and increases his private payoff, even though it 
reduces total surplus in society because some surplus is destroyed in the process. In the Figure 1 
payoffs, for example, successful transgression against a responder reduces the responder’s payoff 
by 6 and increases the leader’s payoff by 3, since a transgression destroys half of the confiscated 
surplus. Second, challenging is costly to the responders regardless of whether or not it succeeds, 
and the responders face a coordination problem in deciding whether to challenge the leader. In 
particular, the transgression will fail (in which case the leader fails to extract any surplus from   7
the responders and also incurs a loss compared to the no transgression benchmark) if and only if 
both responders incur the cost to challenge him. Third, multiple equilibria exist in the top 
subgame in which the leader transgresses against both responders. Both responders challenging 
the leader and both responders acquiescing are possible equilibrium responses by the responders, 
so this subgame is a “stag hunt” game. Fourth, besides transgressing against both responders, the 
leader can also use a divide-and-conquer strategy. For example, in the Figure 1 payoffs when the 
leader transgresses against only one responder he shares 1 of the 3 units of the expropriated 
surplus with the other responder as an attempt to gain her support.  
Note that when the leader transgresses against only one responder, the beneficiary of 
transgression will always prefer to acquiesce, which implies that the victim of transgression will 
also acquiesce. Therefore, even when he expects that a transgression against both responders will 
be met with coordinated challenges, by using the DAC strategy the leader can eliminate the 
threat of coordinated challenge by the responders. These observations imply that the one-shot 
game has three (pure strategy) equilibria, and “no transgression” is not one of them.
4 In one 
equilibrium, the leader transgresses against both responders, with the expectation that such full 
scale transgression will not be met by coordinated resistance. In each of the other two equilibria, 
the leader transgresses against one of the responders and shares some of the expropriated surplus 
with the other responder, with the expectation that no responder will challenge him. Furthermore, 
if all beneficiaries are self-regarding and this is common knowledge to all players, then non-
binding communication between the beneficiary and the victim will not change the prediction 
that “no transgression” cannot be supported as an equilibrium.   
As  Weingast (1995, 1997) points out, if the CR game is repeated indefinitely then 
sufficiently patient players can adopt trigger strategies to support the outcome of (No 
                                                 
4 Allowing for the possibility of mixed-strategy equilibrium does not change the key implications of the CR game, 
so we shall focus on pure-strategy equilibria in the text.    8
Transgression, Acquiesce, Acquiesce) as an equilibrium. For example, the players could adopt 
the following trigger strategies. For the leader, if either responder A or B acquiesced any 
transgression in an earlier period, transgress against both A & B thereafter. Otherwise, do not 
transgress. For responder A, if responder B challenges every previous transgression, then 
challenge any transgression in current period and acquiesce otherwise. If responder B acquiesces 
any previous transgression, then acquiesce forever. Responder B adopts the mirror image of A’s 
strategy. It can be shown that given the payoffs in Figure 1, these strategies support (No 
Transgression, Acquiesce, Acquiesce) as an equilibrium outcome if the discount factor δ  is 
larger than 1/4.
5  
Nevertheless, the outcome in which the leader always practices DAC transgression is still 
an equilibrium in the indefinitely repeated game. For example, the outcome that the leader 
always practices DAC transgression against responder A can be supported by the following 
strategy profile. Regardless of the past history, the leader always chooses DAC transgression 
against A, A and B both always acquiesce except when the leader transgresses against both. It is 
therefore useful to find out whether DAC transgression is observed in the indefinitely repeated 
game, or whether coordinated resistance eliminates transgression most of the time.  
Besides indefinite repetition, we also implement treatments in which subjects play the CR 
game with a fixed, known horizon in this study. We are motivated to conduct these treatments 
for two reasons. First, because there are multiple equilibria in the CR game, even finite repetition 
of the stage game can expand the set of equilibria (Benoit and Krishna, 1987).  For example, 
while No Transgression cannot be supported as an equilibrium outcome in the one-shot CR 
                                                 
5 This result is proved in an appendix available upon request from the authors. Intuitively, the key incentive problem 
here is to ensure that a beneficiary does not want to deviate. This requires that for a beneficiary, the short run gain 
from deviating to acquiescing a DAC transgression is smaller than the long run loss from foregone cooperation, 









. In the appendix, we show that all other no-deviation conditions are 
also satisfied.    9
game, it can be supported as equilibrium outcome up to the second-to-the-last period of the 
finitely repeated CR game by the trigger strategy considered above in the absence of discounting. 
Second, as suggested by Kreps et al. (1982), if players are uncertain about the preferences 
of other players, then this incomplete information can also expand the set of equilibria even with 
finite repetition. Moreover, as we demonstrate below, if some players have social preferences, 
then the no transgression outcome can emerge as part of an equilibrium even in the one-shot 
game when players have incomplete information about preferences. This implies that uncertainty 
regarding whether other players have social preferences is another reason why that transgression 
can be substantially reduced in the finitely repeated CR game.  
Our discussion to this point has focused on the case of standard preferences. We now 
investigate how collective resistance against DAC transgression might occur in equilibrium in 
the one-shot CR game with incomplete information if some agents have social preferences. A 
variety of social preference models would likely provide similar conclusions, and our goal is not 
to distinguish between them. Our objective is to identify plausible equilibrium mechanisms 
through which communication and incomplete information about social preferences can affect 
behavior in the CR game. For this purpose we use an extension that builds on Cox et al. (2007). 
They assume that in a (two-player) sequential move game, when a second-mover with social 
preferences makes her decision after observing the action chosen by the first-mover, the second-
mover’s marginal rate of substitution between her income and the income of the first-mover 
depends on her emotional state toward the first-mover. This emotional state consists of the 
unconditional benevolence (or malevolence) and the conditional benevolence (or malevolence) 
toward this other person. The unconditional emotional state is not affected by the action taken by 
the first-mover. The conditional emotional state, however, depends on whether the second-mover 
thinks positively or negatively about the action taken by the first-mover. If the action by the first-
mover is perceived negatively (positively) by the second-mover, this triggers conditional   10
malevolence (benevolence) toward the first-mover.  
Following this approach, we assume that all agents are of two types. With probability p 
an agent has standard preferences, and with probability (1-p) the agent has social preferences. An 
agent’s type is his/her private information. Our main concern is to examine whether the presence 
of beneficiaries who have social preferences will change behavior, so for simplicity we assume 
that the only conditional emotional reaction that can be triggered in the CR game is the negative 
reaction toward a leader by a responder when the leader practices DAC transgression. Therefore, 
we assume that if responder i is a Social Preferences type (hereafter the SP-type) she regards a 
DAC transgression by the leader as illegitimate, and has a utility function  
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Here,  i y  is agent i’s income,  L y  is the leader’s income,  j y  is the income of the other 
responder, θ  is the (conditional) emotional state variable, 0 ρ θ < <−  measures the strength of 
unconditional altruism toward other agents, and  1 α ≤  (and  0 α ≠ ) is an elasticity of substitution 
parameter. TAB denotes transgression against both responders, and TA and TB denote divide-
and-conquer transgression against A and B, respectively.  
A leader who is an SP-type has a utility function 
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where  i y  and  j y  are the income of responder i and j, respectively. (1) and (2) reflect the 
assumption that the only conditional emotional reaction that we consider is the negative reaction 
that an SP-type responder has toward a leader who practices DAC transgression.  
If an agent is a standard type (hereafter the S-type), then regardless of whether he/she is a   11
leader or a responder, he/she has a (possibly constant relative risk averse) utility function
6 
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One can show that under reasonable assumptions of parameter values for  p , θ ,  ρ  and 
α , the following strategies constitute a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium:  (i) Both types of leader 
practice DAC transgression. (ii) When DAC transgression occurs, an S-type victim challenges 
with probability   () ()
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, while an SP-
type victim always challenges. An S-type beneficiary always acquiesces, and an SP-type 











. (iii) When TAB 
transgression occurs, all types of responders challenge (iv) When there is no transgression, all 
types of responders acquiesce.
7 
In this equilibrium joint resistance against DAC transgression occurs with a positive 
probability, and victims challenge more often than beneficiaries. An S-type beneficiary has no 
incentive to challenge since successful DAC transgression increases her income. An SP-type 
beneficiary regards a DAC transgression as illegitimate and is willing to incur the cost to punish 
the leader provided that she believes that the victim will challenge with a sufficiently high 
probability. A victim prefers that a DAC transgression be thwarted, but the SP-type victim has a 
                                                 
6 Our earlier discussion about the one-shot and the repeated CR game with standard preferences assumes that all 
players are risk neutral. It is straightforward to verify that whenever agents seek to maximize a utility function that 
only depends on and is increasing in their own monetary payoff (as in (3)), the conclusion still holds that all 
equilibria feature transgression in the one-shot CR game. The conclusion that the “no transgression” outcome can be 
supported as an equilibrium in both the indefinitely repeated and finitely repeated CR games also holds, although the 
critical discount factor that supports this can change when the utility function of a standard type changes.  
7 This result is derived in an appendix available upon request. When the parameter values are such that this 
equilibrium exists, there are also other equilibria in the CR game with incomplete information about social 
preferences, including an equilibrium in which both types of beneficiaries, as well as both types of victims, always 
acquiesce when a DAC transgression takes place. We focus on the mixed strategy equilibrium shown in the text 
because among all equilibria, this best describes the observed behavior in the Random Matching/No Communication 
Treatment. For certain parameter values—for example, when the probability that an agent is an SP-type is low—the 
unique equilibrium in the CR game with incomplete information involves all subordinates acquiescing to a DAC 
transgression.    12
stronger incentive to challenge than the S-type because the former also regards a DAC 
transgression as illegitimate and wants to punish the leader. 
8 
  Now suppose that after they observe the choice made by the leader but before they make 
their actual choices, the responders have the opportunity to indicate simultaneously to each other 
their intended choices in non-binding communication. That is, each responder can send a 
message of either “I intend to challenge” or “I intend to acquiesce” to the other. One can show 
that under reasonable assumptions of parameter values, the following strategies constitute a 
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium: (i) Both types of leader choose No Transgression. (ii) If DAC 
transgression occurs, both types of victim will indicate an intention to challenge and will do so if 
the beneficiary also indicates an intention to challenge. The S-type beneficiary will indicate an 
intention to acquiesce and will do so, while the SP-type beneficiary will indicate an intention to 
challenge and will do so. (iii) If the leader transgresses against both responders, all types of 
responders will indicate an intention to challenge and will do so. (iv) When there is no 
transgression, all types of responders will indicate an intention to acquiesce and will do so.
9 
In this semi-separating equilibrium, cheap talk is partially informative and the 
beneficiary’s message helps coordinate resistance. Of course, just like in any cheap talk games, a 
babbling equilibrium in which all the messages are uninformative and ignored always exists. Our 
experimental design allows us to study the effects of communication and compare them to the 
effects of repeated interactions.  
 
3. Experimental  Design     
                                                 
8 The existence of this equilibrium does not depend on the fact that the SP-type agents are also motivated by 
unconditional altruism. One can show that even if  0 ρ = , under reasonable assumptions of parameter values for  p, 
θ  and α , the strategies described in the text constitute an equilibrium. We include unconditional altruism to make 
the model closer to Cox et al. (2007), and to investigate how allowing for unconditional altruism for the SP-type 
leader will affect the incidence of transgression. It turns out that in the equilibrium described in the text, 
unconditional altruism is not sufficient to prevent the SP-type leader from transgressing.  
9 In the appendix, we prove this result and describe more carefully the posterior beliefs of the responders, and how 
each responder’s choice of action depends on her own message as well as the message of the other responder.    13
  This study consists of 52 independent sessions across eight different treatments, as 
summarized in Table 1, involving a large sample of 468 separate human subjects who 
participated at two universities. Subjects were recruited by e-mail, web page and classroom 
announcements from the general student population, and all were inexperienced in the sense that 
they participated in only one session of this study, although some had participated in other 
economics experiments that were completely unrelated to this research project. Sessions lasted 
for at least 48 decision periods. The two treatments featuring random matching (with and without 
communication) are based on data reported in Cason and Mui (2007), while the other six 
treatments involving repeated interactions are new treatments conducted for this study. To our 
knowledge, nearly all of the related laboratory research has focused on either varying the degree 
of repeated interaction or studying the effects of communication. Ours is one of the first to 
examine their interaction and complementarity using a full factorial design.
10 
The experiment instructions employed neutral terminology. For example, “Person 1” 
chose “earnings square” A, B, C or D—which was the transgression decision—and then 
“Persons 2 and 3” simultaneously selected either X or Y—which was the challenge decision. 
(Instructions for the Indefinite Repetition/Communication are in the appendix.) In the 
communication treatments the responders send a restrictive message to the other responder in 
their group: an “intended” choice (either X or Y), prior to committing to an actual challenge or 
                                                 
10 The importance of infinitely repeated interaction in facilitating cooperation has been emphasized in the literature, 
and the laboratory offers a useful environment in which one can implement a probabilistic termination design to 
directly assess the effects of indefinite repetition. As Duffy and Ochs (2006) point out, however, surprisingly few 
laboratory studies have exploited this possibility to identify the empirical conditions under which indefinitely 
repeated play actually facilitates cooperation. Some exceptions include Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994) who consider 
an indefinitely repeated threshold public goods game, and Dal Bó (2005), Duffy and Ochs (2006) and Dal Bó and 
Frechette (2007) who consider the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Interestingly, a similar “dichotomy” 
exists in the experimental literature on communication, which has focused on communication in one-shot games 
(see, for example, Cooper et al., 1989, 1992; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1991; Crawford, 1998). Few studies have 
considered repeated play and communication simultaneously (see Hackett et al., 1994; Wilson and Sell, 1997, who 
study finitely repeated play with communication). In many field settings, however, both communication and 
repetition are likely to be present. A full factorial design allows us to study the joint impacts of communication and 
repetition, and to create “counter-factual” environments in which only either communication or repetition exists, so 
that we can better decompose the effect of each form of coordination as well as understand their interaction.   14
acquiesce decision.  
Each session had nine participants, but two sessions were always conducted 
simultaneously so 18 subjects were present in the lab for each data collection period. In the 
random matching treatments, the instructions emphasized that subjects were randomly re-
grouped each period. The regrouping occurred separately within the two groups of nine subjects 
in the lab, although this was not mentioned in the instructions.  
The Random Matching/No Communication treatment serves as the baseline. We 
introduce repeated games both with pre-determined horizons and with probabilistic termination. 
All matching treatments include conditions where the communication opportunity is present or 
absent in the stage game. In all treatments, subject roles remained fixed: throughout each session 
leaders always remained leaders, and responders always remained responders. 
In the Long Horizon (hereafter LH) Finite Repetition treatment, participants were 
randomly grouped to form a three-person group, with one person of each type in each group, and 
these groupings remained fixed for all 50 periods of the experiment. In the Indefinite Repetition 
treatment, groupings lasted for a random number of periods. At the end of each decision period 
in this treatment, the experimenter threw an eight-sided die, and for die rolls of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 
7 the groupings remained unchanged for another period. Whenever the die roll was 8 on any 
throw, then the current grouping was immediately terminated. If the total number of periods 
conducted in the session at that point exceeded 49, or if less than 30 minutes remained in the two 
and a half hour time period reserved for the session, then the session was also terminated at that 
time. Otherwise, each participant was randomly re-grouped with two other participants to form a 
new three-person group, with one person of each type in each group, and the same procedure was 
used to determine whether groupings would continue at the end of each period.  
In the Equivalent Horizon (hereafter EH) Finite Repetition treatment, subjects were   15
randomly regrouped at the end of every 8
th period. The experimenter also made a verbal 
announcement that regrouping was taking place at these periods. These sessions lasted for 48 
total periods. In the Indefinite Repetition treatment, since groupings end with a probability of 1/8 
in each period, this implies that the repeated game has an expected horizon of 8 periods. Dal Bó 
(2005) argues that if one wants to compare the difference between finite and indefinite repetition 
of a particular game in the laboratory where the latter is implemented using the method of 
probabilistic termination, one should consider a finitely repeated game where its horizon is the 
same as the expected horizon of the indefinitely repeated game. This motivates the specific 
choice of our Equivalent Horizon Finite Repetition treatment.  
Subjects’ earnings were designated in “experimental francs.” They were paid for all 
periods, and their cumulative francs balance was converted to either Australian or U.S. dollars at 
exchange rates that resulted in earnings that considerably exceeded their opportunity costs. The 
per-person earnings typically ranged between US$25 and US$40 for the Purdue sessions and 
between A$30 and A$60 for the Monash sessions.
11 Exchange rates were chosen before 
beginning data collection based on the time required to complete pilot sessions. Sessions without 
communication ran more quickly—some as short at 75 minutes including instructions—while 
those with communication typically required 1.5 to 2.5 hours. We employed more generous 




Figure 2 presents the time series of the rate the leaders transgress, separately for all eight 
treatments. These transgressions are overwhelmingly the divide-and-conquer type, and 
                                                 
11 The exchange rate between U.S. and Australian dollars was approximately 1 AUD = 0.75 USD when the 
experiment was conducted.   16
transgression against both responders is uncommon. Nearly half of the attempts to transgress 
against both responders occur in periods 1 through 10, but these transgressions are met with 
successful coordinated resistance 69 percent of the time. This discourages leaders from pursuing 
this most aggressive type of transgression, and after these initial 10 periods 95.5 percent of the 
transgressions are the DAC type. 
The figure shows that transgression rates vary between about 50 and 85 percent in the 
early periods, and the dispersion across treatments increases over time. Transgression rates 
exhibit a downward trend in all four communication treatments (shown with dashed lines), but 
several of the no communication treatments have an upward trend. In the baseline treatment with 
no communication and random matching, the transgression rate rises above 95 percent in the last 
ten periods. Because our main interest is in stable behavior following the learning phase, in some 
of the data analysis we will exclude the initial 20 periods and focus on the later periods. 
Result 1: Repeated play, especially over a long horizon, reduces the rate that leaders transgress. 
Support: Table 2 presents the transgression rates for each individual session for the later 
periods. Considerable variation exists across sessions within all treatment conditions. Averaged 
across sessions, transgression occurs in these later periods 92.5 percent of the time in the 
Random Matching/No Communication baseline shown on the upper left. Adding repetition (but 
not communication) decreases transgression, with a highly significant decrease for LH Finite 
Repetition (Mann-Whitney U=7.5; for sample sizes n=8, m=6, one-tailed p-value<0.05) and a 
marginally significant decrease for EH Finite Repetition (U=13; one-tailed p-value<0.10), but no 
significant difference for Indefinite Repetition (U=25; ns).  
Result 2: Communication is at least as effective as repeated play in reducing the transgression 
rate. 
Support: Adding communication, even retaining the Random Matching environment, 
results in a highly significant decrease in transgression (U=10; n=m=8, one-tailed p-value<0.05).   17
The interaction of communication and repetition decreases transgression even further, and in 
these late periods the transgression rate falls below 45 percent in the LH Finite 
Repetition/Communication treatment. This is significantly less than the Random Matching/ 
Communication level (U=10; one-tailed p-value<0.05). The other two repetition and 
communication treatments result in marginally significant decreases in transgression relative to 
the Random Matching/Communication level (U=12 and U=12.5; both one-tailed p-value<0.10), 
but all communication/repetition treatments have significantly less transgression than the 
Random Matching/No Communication baseline. Importantly, the transgression rate in the 
Random Matching/Communication treatment is not significantly different from the best repeated 
play no communication treatment (LH Finite Repetition), indicating that communication alone is 
at least as effective as repetition in reducing transgression (U=20; ns).  
Result 3: Holding the matching protocol constant, adding communication always reduces the 
transgression rate. 
Support: The decrease in transgression from adding communication is highly significant 
for Random Matching (U=10;  n=m=8, one-tailed p-value<0.05), Indefinite Repetition (U=3; 
n=m=6, one-tailed p-value<0.01) and LH Finite Repetition (Mann-Whitney approximation 
z=1.78; n=m=18, one-tailed p-value<0.05).
12 The decrease is marginally significant for EH Finite 
Repetition (U=8; n=m=6, one-tailed p-value<0.10). 
4.2  Resistance in the Divide-and-Conquer Subgames 
As noted above, well over 90 percent of the late-period transgressions are the DAC type. 
Recall that a beneficiary with standard, money-maximizing preferences has a dominant strategy 
to acquiesce when facing DAC transgression, which is why the outcome of no transgression 
cannot be supported as an equilibrium in the one-shot game with standard preferences. As 
                                                 
12 Each grouping of three subjects is statistically independent in the LH Finite Repetition treatment because subjects 
are never regrouped. This leads to 18 independent observations per treatment for this matching protocol.   18
pointed out in section 2, beneficiary resistance could be interpreted as an indication of social 
preferences, particularly in the random matching condition, or as part of a repeated game strategy 
with standard preferences in the other treatments.  
The overall resistance rate is considerably higher for victims than for beneficiaries. This 
is consistent with the mixed strategy equilibrium identified in the equilibrium with social 
preferences summarized in section 2. Across all 8 treatments, victims start in early periods 
resisting about 50 to 70 percent of the time on average, but this rate usually declines over time to 
the 20 to 40 percent range in late periods. By comparison, average beneficiary resistance rates 
usually start in a range between 20 and 40 percent in early periods, and decline to range between 
10 and 20 percent in later periods.  
The leader, of course, cares most about the rate that the responders both resist 
simultaneously, since joint resistance is needed to stop a transgression. Therefore, our main 
conclusions here focus on joint resistance. 
Result 4: Without communication, repeated play does not increase the rate of successful joint 
resistance to DAC transgression. 
Support: Table 3 displays the joint resistance rates for each session for the later periods. 
Although the overall treatment average joint resistance rate nearly doubles (to 14 percent) in the 
LH Finite Repetition relative to the Random Matching baseline, too much variation exists across 
sessions for this increase to be statistically significant (U=16;  ns). Likewise, neither of the 
modest increases in joint resistance in the EH Finite Repetition (U=18; ns) or the Indefinite 
Repetition (U=18; ns) treatments are statistically significant. We also estimated random effects 
probit regressions that are more powerful because they include all observations of DAC 
transgression, and not just the session averages, but they provide identical conclusions. 
Result 5:  Adding communication, especially in conjunction with repeated play, significantly 
increases the rate of successful joint resistance to DAC transgression.   19
Support: The right side of Table 3 shows that joint resistance rates are roughly 2 to 4 
times higher with communication compared to the Random Matching/No Communication 
baseline. The increase in the Random Matching/ Communication treatment is only marginally 
significant (U=19;  n=m=8, one-tailed p-value<0.10), but the increases in the EH Finite 
Repetition/Communication (U=9;  n=8,  m=6, one-tailed p-value<0.05) and Indefinite 
Repetition/Communication (U=4.5; n=8, m=6, one-tailed p-value<0.05) are highly significant. 
The increase in resistance for the LH Finite Repetition/ Communication treatment is driven 
largely by one session, so this increase is not statistically significant (U=15.5; n=8, m=6, ns).
13 
Again, random effects probit regressions provide identical conclusions, although the significance 
levels are even higher because these tests are more powerful. 
We close this subsection by noting that the session heterogeneity in transgression and 
resistance (e.g., in Tables 2 and 3) is highly correlated. Leaders apparently reduce their practice 
of DAC transgression in sessions where they face more early coordinated resistance. The average 
transgression rate exceeds 85 percent after period 20 for the 16 sessions in which the successful 
DAC joint resistance rate in periods 1-20 is less than 10 percent. By comparison, the average 
transgression rate is only 42 percent after period 20 for the 7 sessions in which the successful 
DAC joint resistance rate in periods 1-20 is over 40 percent. Over all 52 sessions, the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient between early (periods 1-20) successful DAC joint resistance and 
late (after period 20) transgression is -0.58 (p-value<0.0001).  
4.3  Coordinating Resistance: A “Type Identification” Interpretation 
The equilibrium presented at the end of section 2 illustrates how even restrictive cheap 
talk could change outcomes if some individuals have social preferences, because this 
communication provides opportunities for responders to signal their types. In the repeated games 
                                                 
13 The successful joint resistance rates also increase significantly when communication is allowed, holding the 
matching condition constant, in all but the LH Finite repetition condition.   20
the responders have additional incentives to indicate their type. Repeated play can lead even 
money-maximizing beneficiaries to resist DAC transgression in equilibrium, but because 
multiple equilibria exist the responders face a coordination problem in identifying which type of 
equilibrium they will play. Moreover, responders who have social preferences or wish to be 
perceived has having social preferences in the repeated game may have an incentive to signal 
their type through early period resistance to DAC transgression, particularly when they do not 
have communication opportunities. In this subsection we investigate the content of their 
communication and the patterns of resistance over time in the repeated game to understand better 
how responders might coordinate resistance. 
Result 6: The “intended choice” communicated by the beneficiary is critical for increasing 
resistance to DAC transgression. 
Support: Table 4 displays the different combinations of intended resistance to DAC 
transgression communicated in the four treatments that featured communication, as well as the 
resulting frequencies of actual resistance.  Victims of DAC transgressions indicate an intention to 
challenge about 70 to 75 percent of the time, and beneficiaries indicate an intention to challenge 
about 30 to 35 percent of the time. As noted in the previous subsection, however, in the later 
periods responders actually challenge at about half these indicated rates. Nevertheless, Table 4 
indicates that communication helps coordinate successful resistance. Rows 1 and 4 show that 
successful joint resistance never occurs more than 4 percent of the time when the beneficiary 
does not signal intended resistance. By contrast, row 3 shows that successful joint resistance 
occurs 48 to 70 percent of the time when both responders indicate intended resistance.  
Table 5 presents statistical support for the conclusion that both victims and beneficiaries 
choose to resist a DAC transgression when the beneficiary or (especially) when both responders 
indicate that they intend to resist. These fixed effects logit models indicate that the likelihood of 
actual resistance for both victims and beneficiaries is always significantly higher when only the   21
beneficiary or when both responders indicate an intention to resist, compared to the omitted case 
of no intended resistance. As discussed in section 2, a semi-separating equilibrium exists in 
which the beneficiary’s message is used by the victim to update her belief about the beneficiary’s 
type, thereby coordinating resistance. In this equilibrium the victim’s intention is not used by the 
beneficiary to update his beliefs. The regression results indicate that the impact of the victims’ 
intention is always smaller and sometimes insignificant, consistent with this interpretation that it 
is often considered uninformative “babbling.” In additional regressions (not reported here) we 
find that the influence of the beneficiary’s intention is stronger in the later periods than in the 
earlier periods of the sessions.  
Type signaling is also possible with repeated play when communication is not possible, 
but it may require several periods of interaction within the same group. For a beneficiary to 
indicate an intention to resist a DAC transgression, for example, it would be useful for that 
responder to have been a beneficiary of DAC transgression earlier within the same grouping. 
Earlier periods provide an opportunity for the beneficiary to send a (costly) signal to the victim 
that she intends to resist this type of transgression in later periods. 
Result 7:  In the repeated games, earlier period resistance to DAC transgression by the 
beneficiary significantly increases victims’ resistance to later DAC transgression; however, 
adding communication increases both responders’ resistance more substantially. 
Support: Table 6 presents a series of fixed effects logit models of DAC resistance for the 
three repeated game treatments without communication. These models are similar to those in 
Table 5, except that the intended resistance communications are replaced by actual previous 
resistance to the same kind of DAC transgression in that same grouping. For example, if the 
leader transgresses against Responder A in period 4 of a particular grouping of the repeated 
game, and the last time that the leader transgressed against Responder A during that grouping 
was in period 2, then the actual previous resistance choices by the victim (A) and beneficiary   22
(Responder B) are used as explanatory variables for the current actual resistance decisions. The 
table shows that these previous choices strongly influence later resistance by the victim, in a 
pattern similar to that discussed for intentions in Table 5.  
Table 7 reports that these same patterns are present, but are weaker, in the 
Communication treatments. The logit models in this table include both the previous play as well 
as the communication content, essentially combining the explanatory variables used in Tables 5 
and 6. Previous resistance has a weak and sometimes inconsistent influence on current 
resistance, especially for the beneficiary. By contrast, the variables representing different 
intention messages shown in the middle of the table indicate that both responders strongly 
increase actual resistance when the beneficiary alone, or both responders, indicate an intention to 
resist. Likelihood ratio tests shown toward the bottom of this table indicate that the 
communications are always jointly highly significant determinants of both victim and 
beneficiary resistance. Past resistance for this same pair of responders, by contrast, has a much 
weaker and often insignificant influence on current resistance. Apparently communication is 
more effective than the history of past resistance to coordinate responders’ current resistance. 
Note that even beneficiaries who have strong social preferences and would like to punish 
transgressing leaders may not resist in these repeated games because resistance can be quite 
costly. They must pay the small (1 experimental franc) actual current period cost of resistance, 
but beneficiaries also risk revealing their social preference type to the leader. A leader who faces 
a pair of responders composed of one money-maximizer and one social preference type, for 
example, would like to prey on the social preference type because the money-maximizing 
beneficiary has a dominant strategy to acquiesce. Leaders have access to the same history of 
actions as the responders, and successful signaling to a fellow responder can also result in 
signaling to the leader. The leader does not observe the beneficiary’s intentions in the 
communication treatments, which at least for the random matching condition avoids this risk.   23
Cason and Mui (2007) provide corroborating evidence by systematically manipulating whether 
the leader can observe different types of communication between responders. This influenced 
what intentions were expressed, and private communications more effectively deterred 
transgression. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
Despite the fact that the use of divide-and-conquer strategy by organizational and 
political leaders is pervasive, only recently have scholars begun to study systematically the 
implications of divide-and-conquer transgression (Weingast, 1995, 1997, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 
2004). In particular, Weingast (1995, 1997) develops a collective resistance game which shows 
that with standard preferences, joint resistance against DAC transgression will never occur in the 
one shot CR game, and argues that indefinite repetition can reduce transgression. This paper 
extends his analysis to consider the implications of finite repetition of the CR game, as well as 
the implications of heterogeneous social preferences and non-binding communication. It also 
reports a laboratory experiment to evaluate the effects of communication and repeated 
interactions in this strategic environment. 
We find that both indefinite and finite repetition reduces transgression. Contrary to the 
predictions of a model based on standard preferences, communication reduces transgression even 
with random matching. Furthermore, communication alone is at least as effective as repetition in 
reducing transgression. In the repeated games, earlier period resistance to DAC transgression by 
the beneficiary significantly increases victims’ resistance to later DAC transgression; however, 
adding “intended choice” communication increases both responders’ resistance more.   
An important feature of the laboratory CR game is that it allows for interesting (and 
endogenous) role asymmetries among the players. While the importance of coordination and 
cooperation has been widely studied by economists, the CR game embeds an interesting   24
coordination problem in a larger novel context. In this game, the responders’ ability to solve the 
coordination problem they face determines the leader’s transgression incentives. Moreover, when 
the leader engages in divide-and-conquer transgression, this endogenously leads to asymmetric 
beneficiary and victim roles for the responders. This paper shows that this asymmetry leads to an 
interesting mechanism that limits the effectiveness of repeated interaction in facilitating 
cooperation in this game. Namely, even a beneficiary who has social preferences and would 
prefer to punish transgressing leaders may not resist in a repeated CR game, because she may 
risk revealing her type to the leader and consequently be a victim in future DAC transgressions.  
This reflects how fundamental and endogenous asymmetries in the role of players in a game may 
influence repeated play, an insight that is missing and not obviously obtainable in existing 
laboratory studies of indefinitely repeated games, which tend to focus on the prisoner’s dilemma 
(Dal Bó, 2005; Duffy and Ochs, 2006; Dal Bó and Frechette, 2007) and related public good 
games (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1994).  
Like most other contributions in organizational economics and political economy, the 
emerging literature on divide-and conquer transgression adopts the assumption that all agents 
have standard preferences and are only motivated to pursue their own material interests. 
However, in light of the increasing evidence of the importance of heterogeneous social 
preferences (Camerer, 2003, Gintis, et al., 2005; and the references cited there), a systematic 
investigation of the implications of social preferences for collective action should be a top 
priority (Ostrom, 2003). This study is an exploration in this direction, focusing on the importance 
of social preferences in affecting the incidence of collective resistance and divide-and-conquer 
transgression. We believe it is important to understand how some mechanisms that may be 
deemed ineffective in facilitating collective resistance when all agents have standard preferences 
might be effective in facilitating collective action in the presence of social preferences.  
While a model based on standard preferences suggests that communication should not   25
affect the incidence of leader transgression in the Random Matching/No Communication 
treatment, the model in section 2 illustrates how even very restrictive and nonbinding 
communication can reduce the incidence of leader transgression in the CR game when agents 
have incomplete information about social preferences. Our empirical findings provide initial 
evidence that social preferences can be important in affecting collective resistance and divide-
and-conquer transgression. Since communication facilitates type identification in the presence of 
heterogeneous social preferences, it can help coordinate collective resistance and deter 
transgression. These results suggest the natural conjecture that societies and organizations that 
have invested resources in fostering social interactions that facilitate type identification among 
different groups of individuals who are potential targets of divide-and-conquer transgression—
even when these interactions may not be political in nature per se—may be less likely to suffer 
from divide-and conquer transgression by their leaders. Future theoretical, field and laboratory 
studies that investigate the implications of this conjecture may provide a more complete 
understanding of the role of collective resistance in deterring transgression.    26
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Table 2: Rates for Independent Sessions that Leaders Transgressed (Sessions ordered 
lowest to highest) 
 




  66.7% 37.8% 
Random  90.0% 56.7% 
Matching  91.1% 65.6% 
  94.4% 77.8% 
  97.8% 86.7% 
  100.0% 87.8% 
  100.0% 93.3% 
  100.0% 96.7% 
Treatment Average  92.5% 75.3% 
 41.1%  10.0% 
Long Horizon  43.3% 22.2% 
Finite Repetition  66.7% 38.9% 
  68.9% 47.8% 
  85.6% 52.2% 
  98.9% 94.4% 
Treatment Average  67.4% 44.3% 
  34.5% 44.0% 
Equivalent  Horizon  77.4% 51.2% 
Finite Repetition  78.6% 58.3% 
  92.9% 60.7% 
  97.6% 61.9% 
  97.6% 84.5% 
Treatment Average  79.8% 60.1% 
  40.4% 15.1% 
Indefinite  93.3% 28.0% 
Repetition  95.7% 38.9% 
  98.2% 77.8% 
  100.0% 78.4% 
  100.0% 81.4% 
Treatment Average  87.9% 53.2% 
Note: The early periods 1-20 are excluded from these calculations.   28
Table 3: Rates for Independent Sessions that Responders Successfully Jointly Resist a 
Divide-and-Conquer Transgression (Sessions ordered highest to lowest) 
  




 23.7%  43.1% 
Random 15.0%  24.3% 
Matching 8.9%  21.2% 
 4.4%  12.7% 
 3.4%  8.5% 
 1.2%  4.8% 
 0.0%  2.6% 
 0.0%  1.2% 
Treatment Average  7.1% 14.8% 
  34.8% 88.9% 
Long Horizon  25.8%  15.0% 
Finite Repetition  11.7%  14.0% 
 8.1%  10.8% 
 3.6%  5.7% 
 0.0%  0.0% 
Treatment Average  14.0% 22.4% 
 18.5%  26.5% 
Equivalent  Horizon  11.5%  21.6% 
Finite Repetition  9.5%  17.3% 
 6.2%  12.5% 
 3.2%  9.9% 
 1.3%  8.1% 
Treatment Average  8.4% 16.0% 
 28.9%  57.1% 
Indefinite 12.6%  36.0% 
Repetition 6.3%  25.0% 
 5.3%  17.5% 
 1.9%  17.1% 
 1.7%  8.9% 
Treatment Average  9.5% 26.9% 
Note: The early periods 1-20 are excluded from these calculations. 
   29
Table 4: Challenge and Successful Resistance for Different Combinations of Communicated Messages 
































(1)  Only Victim 114/443  19/443 5/443  72/263 12/263 7/263  86/246 19/246 9/246  53/155 10/155 4/155 
   Indicates Resistance  25.7% 4.3%  1.1%  27.4% 4.6%  2.7%  35.0% 7.7%  3.7%  34.2% 6.5%  2.6% 
(2)  Only Beneficiary  31/78 18/78  9/78 17/33  7/33  5/33 21/38 16/38 11/38  15/24 10/24  8/24 
   Indicates Resistance  39.7% 23.1% 11.5%  51.5% 21.2% 15.2%  55.3% 42.1% 28.9%  62.5% 41.7% 33.3% 
(3)  Both Responders  190/228  117/228  110/228 132/140 93/140 91/140  110/115 81/115 80/115 87/88  57/88  56/88 
   Indicate Resistance  83.3% 51.3% 48.2%  94.3% 66.4% 65.0%  95.6% 70.4% 69.6%  98.9% 64.8% 63.6% 
(4)  Neither Responder  20/141  5/141 0/141 6/73  2/73  0/73 7/105 1/105 0/105  8/142 0/142 0/142 
   Indicates Resistance  14.2%  3.5% 0.0%  8.2% 2.7% 0.0%  6.7% 1.0% 0.0%  5.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Table 5: Fixed Effects Logit Models of DAC Challenge Decision Based on Communicated Messages 
Dependent Variable = 1 if Responder Challenges a DAC Transgression 
         Random Matching    Indefinite Repetition     Equiv. Horizon Finite     Long Horizon Finite 
Message Combinations: 
















Only  Victim  0.12  0.07 1.92** 0.45  2.38**  1.31 1.90** 0.63 
 Indicates Resistance  (0.35)  (0.59)  (0.56)  (0.82) (0.51) (1.06)  (0.46)  (1.14) 
Only  Beneficiary  1.45** 1.74** 3.18** 2.71**  2.61**  4.80** 2.30** 4.21** 
 Indicates Resistance  (0.39)  (0.61)  (0.68)  (0.92) (0.62) (1.18)  (0.62)  (1.21) 
Both  Responders  4.01** 3.23** 5.84** 4.66**  6.40**  4.89** 6.79** 4.70** 
  Indicate  Resistance  (0.42) (0.59) (0.68)  (0.85) (0.74) (1.10)  (1.13)  (1.11) 
1/period 4.19**  2.21*  0.87  -0.06  0.58  0.85  3.35**  4.59** 
  (0.83) (0.98) (0.84) (0.94)  (0.90) (0.89)  (1.18)  (1.62) 
Log likelihood -250.8 -127.7 -144.0 -86.9 -127.9  -69.8 -98.2 -47.9
Observations  855 464 500 458  479  331 376 282 
Notes: All models are estimated with subject fixed effects. Some subjects were dropped due to zero variation in challenge decision. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the one-percent level; * denotes significance at the five-percent 
level; 
† denotes significance at the ten-percent level (all two-tailed tests).   30
Table 6: Fixed Effects Logit Models of DAC Challenge Decision Based on Previous DAC Challenges within Current Grouping: 
No Communication Treatments 
Dependent Variable = 1 if Responder Challenges a DAC Transgression 
      Indefinite Repetition     Equiv. Horizon Finite    Long Horizon Finite 
Resistance in Previous DAC 
Transgression of this Match: 












Only  Victim  1.40** 0.49 1.21** 0.50  0.77**  0.47 
  Resisted  (0.24) (0.48) (0.27) (0.52)  (0.28)  (0.49) 
Only  Beneficiary  1.57** 0.88 2.13** 1.06  1.48* 2.09** 
  Resisted  (0.54) (0.58) (0.56) (0.67)  (0.59)  (0.67) 
Both  Responders  3.52** 0.76 2.96**  2.01** 2.22**  1.05
† 
  Resisted  (0.80) (0.57) (0.68) (0.64)  (0.68)  (0.56) 
1/period 8.92**  -1.32  8.94**  4.42
† 6.55** -5.87
† 
  (2.90) (4.57) (2.63) (2.62)  (2.36)  (3.45) 
Log  likelihood  -204.8 -88.6 -159.7 -63.1  -166.3  -86.8 
Observations  569 271 410 235  468  281 
 
Notes: All models are estimated with subject fixed effects. Some subjects were dropped due to zero variation in challenge decision. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the one-percent level; * denotes significance at the five-percent 
level; 
† denotes significance at the ten-percent level (all two-tailed tests).   31
Table 7: Fixed Effects Logit Models of DAC Challenge Decision Based on Previous DAC Challenges within Current Grouping 
and Current Period Messages Communicated: Communication Treatments 
Dependent Variable = 1 if Responder Challenges a DAC Transgression 






































Only Victim  0.06 0.16 -0.59 0.39 0.51 0.08 0.46 0.11 0.57
† -0.19  0.68
† -0.47 
 Resisted  (0.29) (0.41) (0.40) (0.55) (0.34) (0.48) (0.40)  (0.69)  (0.33)  (0.48) (0.39) (0.71) 
Only Beneficiary  0.74 -0.08 -0.27 -0.93  1.78*  -1.23 1.13 -2.19  2.34* 0.50  3.54
† -0.54 
 Resisted  (0.76) (0.81) (1.01) (1.15) (0.76) (1.00) (1.33)  (1.35)  (1.13)  (0.85) (2.05) (1.58) 
Both Responders 1.90** 1.30**  1.58*  0.84  2.29** -0.69  1.64*  -2.84* 1.23** 0.74
† -0.09 -1.29 
 Resisted  (0.43) (0.43) (0.62) (0.74) (0.51) (0.70) (0.74)  (1.18)  (0.43)  (0.44) (0.66) (0.97) 
Messages:                
Only Victim     2.05** -0.51     2.11** 1.26      1.76**  0.28 
 Indicates Resistance     (0.68)  (1.03)    (0.58)  (1.11)     (0.48)  (1.18) 
Only Beneficiary     3.68** 3.83**    2.27** 5.04**     2.17**  4.59** 
 Indicates Resistance     (0.86)  (1.36)    (0.70)  (1.47)     (0.65)  (1.38) 
Both Responders     5.94** 5.04**    5.84** 5.40**     7.01**  5.65** 
 Indicate Resistance     (0.84)  (1.27)    (0.89)  (1.33)     (1.20)  (1.30) 
1/period  5.16* 1.28 8.95* -0.04 4.40
† -3.53 4.51 -0.31 4.85
† 5.63*  7.39*  7.02 
 (2.34)  (2.06)  (3.56)  (3.23)  (2.51)  (3.81)  (3.20)  (5.33)  (2.65)  (2.78) (3.53) (5.71) 
LR test: Previous 
DAC resist terms 
jointly insignificant    
11.4* 2.8 
 
 6.4  9.4
†     7.5 2.1 
LR test: Current 
cheap talk terms 
jointly insignificant    
130.8** 98.8** 
 
 79.0** 62.0**    101.0**  91.4** 
Log  likelihood -154.1  -93.2 -88.7 -43.8  -115.0  -65.9 -75.5 -34.9  -134.7  -79.6  -84.2  -33.9 
Observations  355 302 355 302 325 197 325 197 352 264  352  264 
Notes: All models are estimated with subject fixed effects. Some subjects were dropped due to zero variation in challenge decision. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the one-percent level; * denotes significance at the five-percent 
level; 
† denotes significance at the ten-percent level (all two-tailed tests). The likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics are distributed χ
2(3 d.f.). 






Figure 1: The Divide-and-Conquer Collective Resistance Game (payoffs are for (Leader, 





   Responder B 
   Acquiesce Challenge 
Responder A 
Acquiesce 8,  9,  2  8, 9, 1 
Challenge  8, 8, 2  0, 7, 7 
Responder B
   Acquiesce Challenge 
Responder A  Acquiesce  8, 2, 9  8, 2, 8 






   Responder B 
   Acquiesce Challenge
Responder A  Acquiesce  12, 2, 2  12, 2, 1 
Challenge  12, 1, 2  0, 7, 7 
   Responder B 
   Acquiesce Challenge 
Responder A 
Acquiesce  6, 8, 8  6, 8, 7 




































No Communication, Random Matching Communication, Random Matching
No Communication, Long Horizon Finite Communication, Long Horizon Finite
No Communication, Equivalent Horizon Finite Communication, Equivalent Horizon Finite




Figure 2: Transgression Rates for All Treatments   34
References 
 
Abreu, Dilip, “On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting,” Econometrica, 
56: 383-396, 1988. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, James Robinson and Thierry Verdier, “Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A 
Model of Personal Rule,” Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and 
Proceedings, 2: 162-192, 2004.  
 
Benoit, Jean-Pierre and Vijay Krishna, “Finitely Repeated Games,” Econometrica, 53: 890-904, 
1987.  
 
Camerer, Colin, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003. 
 
Cason, Timothy and Vai-Lam Mui, “Communication and Coordination in the Laboratory 
Collective Resistance Game,” Experimental Economics, 10: 251-267, 2007. 
Cooper, Russell, Douglas DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas Ross, “Communication in the 
Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results,” RAND Journal of Economics, 
20: 568-587, 1989.  
Cooper, Russell, Douglas DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas Ross, “Communication in 
Coordination Games,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107: 739-771, 1992.  
 
Cox, James, Daniel Friedman, and Steven Gjerstad, “A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and 
Fairness,” Games and Economic Behavior, 59: 17-45, 2007.  
 
Crawford, Vincent, “A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk,” Journal of 
Economic Theory, 78: 286-298, 1998. 
 
Crawford, Vincent and Joel Sobel, “Strategic Information Transmission,” Econometrica, 50: 
1431-51, 1982.  
Dal Bó, Pedro, “Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from 
Infinitely Repeated Games,” American Economic Review, 95: 1591-1604, 2005. 
Dal Bó, Pedro and Guillaume Frechette, “The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated 
Games: Experimental Evidence,” Working Paper, Brown and New York Universities, 
2007. 
 
Duffy, John and Jack Ochs, “Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction,” 
Working Paper, University of Pittsburgh, 2006. 
 
Fischbacher, Urs, “z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments,” 
Experimental Economics, 10: 171-178, 2007. 
   35
Fudenberg, Drew and Eric Maskin, “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or 
with Incomplete Information,” Econometrica, 54, 533-554, 1986. 
 
Gibbons, Robert, “Trust in Social Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated Games,” in 
Karen Cook (ed.), Trust in Society, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001.  
 
Gintis, Herbert, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr, “Moral Sentiments and Material 
Interests: Origins, Evidence, and Consequences,” in Gintis, Herbert, Samuel Bowles, 
Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr., (eds.), Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The 
Foundation of Cooperation in Economic Life, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.  
 
Hackett, Steven, Edella Schlager and James Walker, “The Role of Communication in Resolving 
Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators,” 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 27: 99-126, 1994. 
 
Kreps, David, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson, “Rational Cooperation in the 
Finitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27: 245-252, 1982.  
 
Kutalik, Chris and Jennifer Biddle, “”Airline Workers United’ Forms to fight Concessions 
Industry-Wide,”  Labor Notes Magazine, No. 322, January, 2006 (available at 
http://labornotes.org/node/25).  
 
Machiavelli, The Prince, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 [1513].  
 
Miller, Gary, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
 
North, Douglass and Barry Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of 
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England,” Journal of 
Economic History, 49: 803-832, 1989. 
 
Ostrom, Elinor, “Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and Reputation,” in 
Elinor Ostrom and James Walker, (eds.), Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary 
Lessons from Experimental Research, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003.  
 
Palfrey, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal, “Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods 
Game with Private Information,” Games and Economic Behavior, 3: 183-220, 1991. 
 
Palfrey, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal, “Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An 
Experimental Study,” Review of Economic Studies, 61: 545-565, 1994. 
 
Sun, Tze, The Art of War, Translation by Cheng Lin, Taipei: The World Book Company, 2006 
[476-221 BC]. 
  
Weingast, Barry, “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism 
and Economic Development,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11: 1-31, 
1995. 
   36
Weingast, Barry, “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,” American 
Political Science Review, 91: 245-263, 1997. 
 
Weingast, Barry, “The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 19: 89-108, 2005. 
 
Wen, Quan, “A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games,” Review of Economic Studies, 
69:493-512, 2002.  
 
Wilson, Rick and Jane Sell, “ ‘Liar, Liar…’ Cheap Talk and Reputation in Repeated Public 
Goods Settings,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41: 695-717, 1997. 
   1
Appendix: Instructions for Indefinite Repetition/Communication Treatment 
  This is an experiment in the economics of multi-person strategic decision making. The 
National Science Foundation has provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions 
and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. The currency 
used in the experiment is francs. Your francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of 10 
francs to one dollar. At the end of today’s session, you will be paid in private and in cash. 
  It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have 
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will 
come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will 
not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation. 
  The experiment consists of many separate decision making periods. The 18 participants 
in today’s experiment will be randomly split each period between three equal-sized groups, 
designated as Person 1, Person 2 and Person 3 groups. If you are designated as a Person 1, then 
you remain in this same role throughout the experiment. Participants who are not designated as a 
Person 1 switch randomly between the Person 2 and Person 3 roles at specific points in the 
experiment when individuals may be re-grouped, as explained later. 
  At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly re-grouped with two other 
participants to form a three-person group, with one person of each type in each group. You will 
be grouped with these same two participants for a random number of periods, as explained later.  
Your Choice 
  During each period, you and all other participants will make one choice. Earnings tables 
are provided on separate papers, which tell you the earnings you receive given the choices that 
you and others in your group make.  If you are Person 1 then you choose the earnings square, 
either A, B, C or D. You make this choice before the other two people in your group make their 
choice, on a decision screen as shown in Figure 1 on the next page. 
After learning which earnings square the Person 1 chose, then Persons 2 and 3 make 
their choices. However, after learning Person 1’s earnings square choice but before making their 
actual choice, Persons 2 and 3 have an opportunity to privately communicate to each other an 
“intended” choice. As noted on the example Intention Screen for Person 2 (see page 3), Persons 
2 and 3 are not required to make the same actual choice as the intended choice they share with   2
the other person, and they are always free to select either choice X or Y when they make their 
actual decision. Persons 2 and 3 indicate their intended choices simultaneously; for example, if 
you are Person 3 then you do not learn the intended choice of Person 2 until after you indicate 
your intended choice. 
 
Decision Screen for Person 1   
 
The computer program displays Person 2’s intended choice to Person 3, and it displays 
Person 3’s intended choice to Person 2. Only these two people observe these intended choices, 
and they are displayed on the top of the Decision Screen as shown on page 4. These intended 
choices should be recorded on the Personal Record Sheet. Persons 2 and 3 then make their actual 
choice simultaneously; for example, if you are Person 2 then you do not learn the actual choice 
of Person 3 until after you make your choice. Both Persons 2 and 3 may choose either X or Y.   3
 




Decision Screen for Person 3 (Person 2’s is very similar)   4
 
  Your earnings from the choices each period are found in the box determined by you and 
the other two people in your group. If both Persons 2 and 3 choose X, then earnings are paid as 
shown in the box in the upper left on the screen. If both Persons 2 and 3 choose Y, then earnings 
are paid as shown in the box in the lower right on the screen. The other two boxes indicate 
earnings when one chooses X and the other chooses Y. To illustrate with a random example: if 
Person 1 chooses earnings square A, Person 2 chooses X and Person 3 chooses Y, then Person 1 
earns 12, Person 2 earns 2, and Person 3 earns 1. You can find these amounts by looking at the 
appropriate square and box in your page of earnings tables. 
The End of the Period 
  After everyone has made choices for the current period you will be automatically 
switched to the outcome screen, as shown below. This screen displays your choice as well as the 
choices of the people in your group. It also shows your earnings for this period and your earnings 
for the experiment so far.  
 
Example Outcome Screen (Shown for Person 2)   5
 
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your choice and the choice of the others 
in your group on your Personal Record Sheet. Also record your current and cumulative earnings 
for this grouping. Click on the OK button on the lower right of your screen when the 
experimenter instructs you. 
The Random Ending to Each Grouping 
You will remain grouped with the same two other people in your group for some random number 
of periods. At the end of each decision period, we will throw an eight-sided die on the floor in 
front of some of the participants. The outcome of the roll will be announced verbally to 
everyone. If the die comes up 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7, then you will remain grouped with these same 
two people for another period; at the end of the next period, the die will be thrown again, and 
again the grouping will continue for at least another round if a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 is thrown.  
If the die comes up an 8 on any throw, then the current grouping is immediately 
terminated. If the total number of periods conducted in the experiment at that point exceeds 49, 
or if less than 30 minutes remain in the two-hour block of time reserved for this lab session, then 
the experiment will also be terminated at that time. Otherwise, you will be randomly re-grouped 
with two other participants to form a new three-person group, with one person of each type in 
each group. You will remain grouped with these same two people for some random number of 
periods, with the same die-throwing rule to determine the termination of each random re-
grouping of participants. At these re-grouping points, participants who are not designated as a 
Person 1 switch randomly between the Person 2 and Person 3 roles. The participants who may 
switch roles is determined randomly, and some may switch while others may not switch. 
We will now pass out a questionnaire to make sure that all participants understand how to read 
the earnings tables and understand other important features of these instructions. Please fill it out 
now. Raise your hand when you are finished and we will collect it. If there are any mistakes on 
any questionnaire, I will summarize the relevant part of the instructions again. Do not put your 
name on the questionnaire. 